THERE IS SOMETHING peculiar about international law. Ever since
its emergence as an autonomous professional discipline, international
law has been a contested object. For how can law exist – let alone rule
– among sovereign nations that recognise no authority beyond their own? What
can be the significance of a legal system in which juridical subjects themselves,
and most notably powerful ones, control the meaning and enforcement of legal
rules? In any case, should one really speak of ‘international’ law when, historically,
this law has been created by and for European nations? Although at the
turn of the twentieth century international law has consolidated its position
within the academy, through the creation of new chairs, learned societies and
scientific publications, scepticism remains high. International law is too different
from the familiar forms and techniques of municipal law. It seems primitive,
weak and under-elaborated. Above all, international law is accused of being
either too philosophical or too political