Although by the middle of the twentieth century most Western democracies
had written constitutions and many of them included a bill of rights,
the power to determine the content of these rights belonged to the elected
legislature. Since then this power has been transferred in most countries
to courts. As Ran Hirschl says, ‘Around the globe, in numerous countries
and in several supranational entities, fundamental constitutional reform
has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative
institutions to judiciaries.’1 This institutional transition has been accompanied
by an intellectual change: today most legal scholars wholeheartedly
embrace the aforementioned transfer of power. Although there
has always been a couple of constitutional theorists who criticized the
judicialization of politics, and some of them put forward sophisticated
arguments, their works have had little effect on the general intellectual
climate. In many places of the world the belief that majoritarian
democracy has to give way to a more enlightened model of government
has become so ingrained that conferring sweeping powers on constitutional
courts no longer requires justification. The legitimacy of constitutional
review, to use John Stuart Mill’s words, is ‘not fully, frequently,
and fearlessly discussed’, and, therefore, the belief in the justifiability of
constitutional review is held ‘as a dead dogma, not a living truth’.