Legal interpretation was a matter of great controversy in 19th century
Germany. The conflicts that took place between the historical school and
what was deemed the school of Begriffsjurisprudenz is well known. This
debate increasingly broadened divisions between the Germanisten and the
Romanisten, and Savigny, Puchta, Jhering are just some of the names that
come to mind as the major actors at play. The issue of legal interpretation has
continued to be discussed in the 20th century; a great part of the works of
Zitelmann, Ehrlich, Gény, Kelsen, Holmes, Cardozo, Llewellyn, Hart and,
more recently, of Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and Neil MacCormick have
been devoted to pressing interpretive questions. These questions include
those concerning the issues of “judge-made law,” silences in the law, the
idea of “one right answer”, the Janus-faced character of legal interpretation,
and the nature of legal reasoning itself. In addition, the “linguistic
turn,” influenced by the views of L. Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and H.-G.
Gadamer, among others, accentuated this focus on the role of interpretation
in the creation of legal norms.