Famously, Marx said, in the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, but the point is to change it’.1 Aside from the academic purpose of the work, with this book, I have one specific practical aim. In this book I examine both legal scholarship and legal practice. The examination of practice is inspired by the work of practising lawyers I have met over the years and also by my own time in practice. Michael Sfard, one of the best-known anti-occupation lawyers working in the Israeli court system, has expressed the need for academic reflection on cause lawyering practice, and, in particular, to analyse how such practice may constitute the lifeblood of the system of oppression it is seeking to overturn. He observes that practising lawyers’ ethics prevent them from turning away individual clients whose lives might be marginally improved through litigation, in favour of the ‘collective struggle’ (which may be helped by, say, boycotting the courts).2 The onus of finding the way through this dilemma, he argues, is on legal academics. Legal academics in his view have the obligation to rise above the perspective of individual cases and provide practitioners with a better understanding of how human rights litigation in mass abuse cases works to sustain the system.