The volume “Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory” deals with theoretical and philosophical problems of legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fill a number of distinct roles in science, philosophy, but also in legal theory and law. Some of these roles are complementary, while others stand in tension or have little in common. The title of this volume suggests two types of problems. Let us begin with the first one—that of a theory of legal evidence. Imagine a jurisprudence scholar who wants to find secure ways of navigating in the waves of evidence scholarship. Other legal theorists may overwhelm her by referring to diverse approaches to evidence and proof in legal systems of the contemporary world. Some of those differences would stem from general differences between common and civil law. E.g. parties play an active role in fact-finding in common law countries, while in civil law countries, the judge plays the main investigatory role. Describing the concept of legal evidence might therefore become something like cleaning out the Augean stables, by trying to compare the taking of evidence in the Anglo-American and continental systems, but without success. Professional lawyers are bound to deal with evidence and proof, but they are certainly not bound to theorize about it.